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SUITABILITY AND NON-
MALEFICENCE: A PROPOSAL FOR 
INSURANCE PRODUCER REGULATORY 
REFORM 
Mark Franke* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There are worse things in life than death. Have you ever spent an evening with an 
insurance salesman? –Woody Allen1 
 
et’s face it: spending time with an insurance agent is 
probably not on the top of the list of things you love to do. 
But when you buy a new car, add an addition to your house, or 
get a new job that boosts your earning capacity, calling your 
agent is surely near the top of the list of the things you have to do. 
We call our agents—in statutory parlance, “producers”2 —tell 
them about the change of our circumstances and, as painlessly 
and quickly as possible, aim to get the coverage we need. While 
we vary in our solicitude, to some extent those of us who use an 
agent to obtain coverage for our risks inevitably rely on our 
agents to understand these risks and obtain for us coverage at a 
reasonable cost; we ask our agents to take care of us, trusting that 
they will exercise basic diligence in their service to us and will 
“tell the truth and . . . keep their promises.”3 
But should we as a matter of course? Perhaps. After all, as 
                                                          
 *  The University of Michigan Law School, J.D. 2013. 
 1  Jamie Frater, Top 25 Woody Allen Quotes, LISTVERSE, 
http://www.listverse.com/2007/12/09/top-15-woody-allen-quotes/ (last visited 
May 2, 2013). 
 2  See, e.g., PRODUCER LICENSING MODEL ACT OF 2005. 
 3  Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law in the Twenty-First Century, 91 B.U. L. 
REV. 1289, 1291 (2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
L 
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a general principle, “[t]rust saves time and money. . . allow[ing] 
[us] to use the talents of strangers” on matters about which we 
lack expertise.4  Attendant to such trust, however, lies the menace 
of its abuse and the cost of protecting ourselves from the harm 
that would result from exploitation.5  So perhaps not. While the 
law generally should conform to our reasonable expectations,6 
such reliance must be objectively reasonable for a court to give 
recompense for any resulting harm.7 Even if judges are loath to 
impose any duties commensurate to such reliance, agents are not 
so reluctant to invite duty, to varying degrees, from unwary 
consumers.8 This paper proposes a new statutory framework of 
duties for the regulation of insurance producers to address the 
trust consumers’ place in producers. It aims to impose duties on 
producers that are tailored to allow for a reasonable level of 
reliance by consumers on professionals of this type. 
Heightened duties may arise by contract or statute.9 They 
may also be implied in a relationship, such as the duty of care in 
tort law10 or in special relationships wherein one party reposes 
trust and confidence in another to act in his best interest and the 
other accepts such trust.11 There are, generally, two moving parts 
which may be tinkered with to arrive at the appropriate cocktail 
of duties: duty of care and duty of loyalty. The duty of care is 
essentially a duty to exercise proper diligence required by the task 
                                                          
 4  TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA’S BUSINESS 
CULTURE AT A CROSSROAD 49 (2006). 
 5  Frankel, supra note 3, at 1291. 
 6  See C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 176 
(Iowa 1975) (citing Rodman v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 208 N.W.2d 903, 905-
08 (Iowa 1973). 
 7  See id. 
 8  See, e.g., TWG INSURANCE, http://www.twginsurance.com (last visited 
May 5, 2013) (suggesting that it will obtain “the best coverage at the lowest 
cost”); STILLWELL INSURANCE, http://www.stillwellinsurance.com/home.html 
(last visited May 5, 2013) (suggesting that the broker will find insurance 
companies “best suited to your individual needs” and admonishing that “it is to 
your advantage to have a trained professional to look out for your interests”). 
 9  See Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing and Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 
899, 902 (2011). 
 10  Where there is a foreseeable victim of a foreseeable harm which could 
result from the actions of an actor, the actor is generally held to have a duty to 
take reasonable steps to prevent such harm. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. 
of California, 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976) (citing cases). 
 11  See, e.g., Broomfield v. Kosow et. al, 212 N.E.2d 556, 560 (Mass. 1965) 
(holding that the depositing of trust must be accompanied by the acceptance of 
such trust for a fiduciary relationship to arise). 
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at hand.12 The duty of loyalty is the duty of an agent not to enrich 
himself at the expense of his agent; it is the renunciation of self, 
“however hard the abnegation.”13 When we entrust ourselves or 
our property to another we accordingly may do so in two ways: 
(1) by trusting the other will exercise sufficient thoughtfulness 
(care) or (2) by trusting the other to renounce their self-interest in 
favor of ours (loyalty). These moving parts, however, have been 
sliced up and re-grafted into a so-called “suitability standard” in 
the context of broker-dealers of financial securities. The 
suitability standard is less onerous than full fiduciary duties but 
treats broker-dealers as more than mere salespersons. A similar 
standard, together with other specific rules, has now been set 
forth in the Dodd-Frank Act for the regulation of mortgage 
brokers. Following the trend set by this adaptation of the 
suitability standard in the Dodd-Frank Act, in this paper I shall 
propose a modified version of the suitability standard for 
insurance producers and a rule not to harm when choosing 
among suitable contracts, what I will term a “non-maleficence” 
rule. Together, these will create an appropriate cocktail of care 
and loyalty tailored specifically to the insurance producer 
context.14 
This paper begins with two premises. First, that 
consumers always rely upon producers to take care of their needs. 
Second, that producers should not enrich themselves at the 
expense of the customer. There are, correspondingly, two 
problems this paper aims to address. The first—that there is no 
duty for insurance producers to sell insurance contracts suitable 
to the customer—arises out of the deficiency of the common law 
of agency and the failure of licensing strategies to separate all the 
chaff from the grain. The second—that there is nothing that 
prevents producers from steering consumers to contracts which 
lead to better compensation outcomes for the producer while 
                                                          
 12  See In re Caremark Int’l Inv. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. 
Ch. 1996). 
 13  Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 548 (N.Y. 1928). 
 14  The application of a suitability standard to life insurance producers has 
been suggested before. See generally Richard J. Wirth, My Customer’s Keeper: 
The Search for A Universal Suitability Standard in the Sale of Life Insurance, 
24 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 47 (2002). Professor Wirth’s study, however, focused 
on the appropriate calculations for defining the scope of a customer’s need for 
life insurance in connection with a possible suitability analysis and the 
correspondingly appropriate life insurance products. See id. at 63-69. The 
current study focuses on applying a suitability requirement and non-
maleficence rule to all insurance producers. 
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costing the consumer more—arises out of compensation 
arrangements that may lead to a producer steering a consumer to 
an insurer or a policy that puts more dollars in the producer’s 
pocket. 
The law regulating the placement of consumer insurance 
contracts by insurance producers is fractured. As a matter of the 
common law, it is a complicated question of fact to whom 
producers owe their allegiance as agents.15 Moreover, there is 
usually no duty to advise the customer on the appropriateness of 
a given insurance contract for the particular customer. The law 
generally treats producers as the mere salesmen that were the 
subject of Mr. Allen’s lament.16 But, due to the high verification 
costs and lack of expertise with respect to consumers of insurance 
contracts, the law does not reflect the reasonable expectation that 
producers will take care of the consumer purchasers.17 While 
increasing requirements may increase transaction costs, this may 
be offset by increased trust in markets that accompanies the 
better advice and the reduction of information asymmetries.18 
In the area of compensation arrangements that cause 
producer-customer conflicts of interest, some states address the 
problem through a broker fee disclosure requirement. Others 
require, upon request, commission and quote comparison 
disclosures.19 Even if these disclosures provide the information 
needed for the market to solve these conflicts of interest, the 
efficacy of disclosures to consumers is questionable. Moreover, 
the market for consumer insurance contracts is not such that 
information is widely incorporated into the price that consumers 
are willing to pay. Lastly, all states license producers, but 
licensing fails to ensure that each transaction is consummated 
                                                          
 15  For a discussion of agency, see infra Section III.A.1. 
 16  For a discussion of producer duties under the common law, see infra 
Section III.A.2. 
 17  See FRANKEL, supra note 4, at 52 (noting the relationship between 
monitoring costs and heightened duties); see also Daniel Schwarcz, 
Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1263, 1325 
(2011) (noting the low likelihood that consumer insurance purchasers would 
understand the contracts, even if they had access to them). 
 18  See Raymond H. Brescia, Capital in Chaos: The Subprime Mortgage 
Crisis and the Social Capital Response 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 271, 314 (2008) 
(“[The l]aw can [provide] trust . . . by the creation of fiduciary duties that may 
help to offset information asymmetries.”). 
 19  For a discussion of fee and compensation disclosures, see infra Section 
III.C.B. 
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with the consumer’s interest in mind.20 
This paper will use the examples of the suitability 
requirements imposed upon brokers of financial securities by 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the self-
regulating organization (SRO) of the financial industry, the 
record-keeping requirements imposed on securities brokers by the 
U.S. securities laws, the anti-steering provisions of the Dodd-
Frank Act applicable to residential mortgage brokers, and the 
rules promulgated pursuant to Dodd-Frank and the securities 
laws by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), all of which 
provide useful models for the regulation of insurance producers. 
Before arriving at its end, this paper will begin with a brief 
introduction to the categories of insurance producers. It will 
follow with an exposition of the two problems this paper’s 
proposal aims to ameliorate and, in so doing, exposit and critique 
the current regulation of insurance producers through the 
common law, licensure, and compensation disclosure regimes. 
II.  INTRODUCTION TO INSURANCE MARKET 
PRODUCERS 
As a preliminary matter, it is important to make clear that 
the contracts which insurance producers broker are adhesion 
contracts,21 as this is essential to the nature of a producer’s role in 
the transaction. While contrary to the classical contract law 
notion that a contract should be a “meeting of the minds,” 
adhesion contracts have come to be accepted because they 
facilitate a more efficient economy. These contracts reduce 
transaction costs, notwithstanding the risk that the terms may 
unfairly protect the party who offers them.22 To protect against 
such risk, state legislatures may expressly dictate acceptable 
terms for the insurance contracts or delegate the authority to 
approve the terms of contracts to state regulators.23 In light of the 
regulatory oversight of the contract terms and the fact that, in 
                                                          
 20  For a discussion of licensing regimes for insurance producers, see infra 
Section III.C.A. 
 21  See 1-1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.4 (1993) (internal citation omitted). 
 22  Id. 
 23  Id.; see, e.g., Texas Ins. Code, Tit. 10, Subtit. 1, Ch. 2301, Subch. A, § 
2301.006 (requiring that the insurance commissioner approve of any form used 
for writing property and causality insurance prior to use by an insurance 
company). 
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most cases, consumer insurance contracts cover relatively small 
risks, direct negotiation is not necessary.24 It follows that it is 
equally unnecessary to have an agent of the insurer with 
authority to negotiate terms of the contract to broker the 
transaction. As such, most consumer contracts are consummated 
through a third party producer without such authority.25 
An insurance producer is “an individual or . . . firm, with 
some degree of independence from the insurer, which stands 
between the buyer and the seller of insurance.”26 There are a few 
types of insurance producers: exclusive agents, managing general 
agents, brokers, and independent agents. Exclusive agents act as 
an authorized and exclusive representative of one, or primarily 
one, insurer.27 Managing the general agents are a specialized type 
of broker who can underwrite on behalf of insurers and place 
contracts with insurers.28 
Brokers are generally understood to be firms who serve as 
market makers with a multi-regional scope and providing a wide 
range of sophisticated services such as modeling risk, managing 
captive insurers, loss control services, and risk modeling and 
management.29 Brokers are generally considered to be agents of 
the insured, notwithstanding that they often consummate “agency 
appointment” contracts undertaken with the insurers.30 
Independent agents are sometimes characterized as non-exclusive 
agents of the insurer,31 and sometimes as independent of the 
insurer.32  The line between brokers and independent agents blurs 
as a practical matter, for they often perform nearly identical 
services to the purchasers of policies,33 but independent agents 
tend to be smaller, regional service providers to primarily small 
                                                          
 24  LEE R. RUSS, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d. § 1:2 (2012). 
 25 Id. 
 26  J. David Cummins & Neil A. Doherty, The Economics of Insurance 
Intermediaries, 73 J. RISK & INS. 359, 360 (2006). 
 27  Id. at 360-61. 
 28  See Managing General Agent (MGA), IRMI, 
http://www.irmi.com/online/insurance-glossary/terms/m/managing-general-
agent-mga.aspx (last visited May 5, 2013). 
 29  Cummins & Doherty, supra note 26, at 361. 
 30  Id. 
 31  See, e.g., id. 
 32  See Agent/Broker Compensation Disclosure, ZURICH IN NORTH 
AMERICA, http://www.zurichnaproducercompensation.com/Welcome.aspx 
(last visited May 5, 2013) (noting that Zurich “value[s], and customers rely on, 
agents’ and brokers’ trusted professional advice” and that “brokers and 
independent agents are not employed by Zurich”). 
 33  Cummins & Doherty, supra note 26, at 361. 
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businesses and consumers.34 Cummins and Doherty suggest that 
the true distinction between brokers and independent agents is 
the volume and breadth of services offered.35 The use of terms in 
the industry for the various intermediaries is, in a word, 
muddled.36 
Baker and Logue note that a purist might insist that the 
term agent should only be used to describe someone who acts as 
an agent of the insurer.37 The taxonomy of producers, however, is 
immaterial to this study, as its proposal is to apply a blanket 
suitability standard and non-maleficence rule upon all producers 
who broker consumer insurance contract transactions.38 
III.  THE PROBLEMS 
A.  Problem 1: Producers Have No Duty to Advise 
Notwithstanding that insurance producers are often the 
only person the end consumer interacts with at the time of 
contract formation; producers in general have no duty to guide 
the consumer to a contract that is suitable to their needs. This 
section will describe more fully the first problem this paper aims 
to address through the imposition of a modified suitability 
requirement. It will lay out the common law principles of agency 
                                                          
 34  Id. 
 35  Cummins & Doherty, supra note 26, at 361. 
 36  See, e.g., Leslie Jackson Conwell, The Role of Health Insurance 
Brokers: Providing Small Employers with a Helping Hand, CENTER FOR 
STUDYING HEALTH SYSTEM CHANGE Issue Brief No. 57, 2 (Oct. 
2002),http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/480/480.pdf (“Brokers are 
typically independent agents . . . .”) (emphasis in original). 
 37  TOM BAKER & KYLE LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW [Manuscript Ch. 2, page 
41] (3d ed. 2013) (on file with author). It appears that California is one state 
which actually adheres to this framework, calling only those producers not 
appointed and without actual authority to bind the insurer a “broker” and 
those producers who are appointed, who have a delineated scope of actual 
authority in their agency contract. Stephen L. Young, When May Broker-
Agents Charge Fees?, at 1-2, 
http://www.ibawest.com/pdf/Articles/WhenMayBrokerAgentsChargeFees.pdf. 
In addition, insurers are required to file notice with the California Department 
of Insurance when any such appointment is made. Id. 
 38  The proposed duty framework contained herein should be applied to 
both individual producers acting on their own behalf and upon larger 
producers, those fitting Cummins and Doherty’s definition of “broker,” see 
supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text, by the acts of its employees 
according to respondeat superior principles. 
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applicable to insurance producers and the limited duties they owe 
the consumers they serve. 
1.  Agency 
Insurance brokers sit in a curious position: as they 
providing a service to the consumer, while being paid by 
insurance companies.39 Who is their master? Where do their 
loyalties lie? Is an insurance broker only a market maker? Is an 
insurance broker an advisor to the policy purchaser? Or both? Is 
the insurance broker an agent of the insurer? Are there reasons to 
believe that a particular insurance broker has a special 
relationship to the policy purchaser such that the latter reposes 
trust and confidence in the former? These questions permeate the 
common law duties owed by an insurance broker to the consumer 
purchaser. The answers to these questions determine the scope of 
a broker’s duties to a purchaser. 
Depending on the facts and circumstances of a given 
transaction, courts come out differently on the question of who is 
a producer’s principal.40 Obviously, this is a fact-intensive 
inquiry, requiring judicious analysis by the fact finder,41 which 
this paper proposes replacing with a new standard and rule 
imposed upon all producers who transact with consumers. 
The extent of a producer’s duties to consumer purchasers 
of insurance is limited in part because producers are generally 
considered special agents.42  In the classical sense, an agent is a 
fiduciary of its principal and is subject to his or her principal’s 
control.43 An agent must “act loyally for the principal’s benefit in 
all matters connected . . . [to] the agency relationship.”44 There are 
two types of agents: general and special. A general agent is one 
with authority to act on behalf of his principal in a series of 
transactions involving ongoing service.45 A special agent is one 
                                                          
 39  See 1-2 Responsibilities of Insurance Agents and Brokers § 2.10. 
 40  Daniel Gregory Sakall, Can the Public Really Count on Insurance 
Agents to Advise Them? A Critique of the “Special Circumstances” Test, 42 
ARIZ. L. REV. 991, 991-93 (2000). 
 41  See Schimmel Fur Co. v. American Indem,. Co., 440 S.W.2d 932, 938 
(Mo. 1969) (holding that the question of whether a broker is an agent of the 
insured, the insurer, or both is a question of fact). 
 42  RUSS, supra note 24, at § 46:1, at 46-7. 
 43  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). 
 44  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006). 
 45  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 3 (1958). Note that the third 
restatement abandoned the definitions of general and special agents. 
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who is “authorized to conduct a single transaction or a series of 
transactions not involving continuity of service.”46 As a special 
agent, therefore, producers have no ongoing duties to any policy 
purchaser for whom they broker a contract.47 
Moreover, an insurance producer often acts as a dual 
agent, that is, as an agent of the insured in some respects and an 
agent for the insurer in others.48 For instance a broker may act as 
an agent for the insurer by collecting premiums and delivering 
them to the insurer and as an agent for the insured in the 
brokering of an insurance contract.49 The key to the dual agency 
concept is that the dual roles must not create a conflict of 
interest.50 
Most case law and scholarship on agency principles 
applicable to producers focuses on the extent to which acts or 
statements of producers can be imputed to insurers. Enough cases 
have been decided51 and enough has been written52 on the 
circumstances under which acts of an insurance producer may be 
imputed to the insurer. This paper is not concerned with the 
circumstances under which acts or statements of a producer may 
be imputed to the insurer or admitted as parol evidence. It is 
concerned with imposing duties upon all producers who face the 
consumers in the insurance marketplace to encourage trust and 
efficiency in the consumer insurance markets. 
2.  Broker Duties at Common Law 
What is the scope of a producer’s duty to his customer? In 
general, it is very limited in scope and, consistent with the notion 
that they are special agents, circulates around the transaction 
brokered. Because the contracts offered to consumers are 
adhesive, the primary activity of the producer is the delivery of 
the contract. As such, there are three sets of facts under which a 
policy purchaser may have a viable cause of action: (1) where the 
broker fails to deliver the insurance promised; (2) where the 
broker fails to obtain certain specific coverage requested; or (3) 
                                                          
 46  Id. 
 47  RUSS, supra note 24, at § 46:38, at 46-84. 
 48  Id. 
 49  1-2 New Appleman Insurance Law Practice Guide § 2.07[4][d] (2012). 
 50  Id. at § 2.07[4][c][ii] (2012). 
 51  See, e.g., Economy Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bassett, 525 N.E.2d 539 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1988). 
 52  See, e.g., 1-2 Responsibilities of Insurance Agents and Brokers § 2.05 
(2013). 
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where the broker fails to obtain the amount of coverage 
requested.53 
Brokers do not have any duty to determine the 
appropriate amount of insurance for a particular purchaser of a 
policy.54 Likewise, they generally do not have a duty to advise on 
the coverage that a purchaser should obtain.55 Similarly, there is 
no duty to explain the coverage.56 In general, there is no 
reasonableness lens applied to the facts surrounding a 
transaction. That is, any argument that the broker should have 
known coverage was needed in a particular situation will likely 
fail.57 In essence, the only duty owed to the purchaser is to obtain 
and deliver the policy requested by the purchaser.58 That is, with 
the rare exception, insurance producers are generally treated as 
mere salespersons.59 They merely present a quote, fill out the 
forms, accept the payment, and deliver the policy promised. 
While this duty might catch outright fraud, abusive, or dishonest 
behavior in connection with the delivery of the policies 
requested,60 the common law courts are reluctant to impose any 
kind of duty upon brokers, notwithstanding the inevitable 
reliance upon them by consumers. 
Under certain circumstances, a special relationship might 
arise between a broker and the insured such that a duty to advise 
                                                          
 53  Saunders v. Cariss, 274 Cal. Rptr. 186, 188-89 (Ct. App. 1990). 
 54  RUSS, supra note 24, at § 46:38, at 46-88. 
 55  See, e.g., Nelson v. Davidson, 456 N.W.2d 343 (Wis. 1990) (finding no 
duty to advise client to get additional coverage for underinsured motorist 
coverage); Wang v. Allstate Ins. Co., 592 A.2d 527, 532 (N.J. 1991) (finding no 
duty to advise on the scope of coverage for a homeowner’s policy). 
 56   Durham v. Mobile Oil Corp., 12 F.3d 55, 57-58 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(applying Louisiana law); Avila v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 147 F. Supp. 
570, 581 (W.D. Tex. 1999) (applying Texas Law). 
 57  See, e.g., May v. United Services Ass’n of America, Inc., 844 S.W.2d 
666 (Tex. 1992) (rejecting that a broker should have known from the facts 
surrounding the transaction that certain coverage was needed). 
 58  Kaufmann v. Leatherstocking Coop. Ins. Co., 861 N.Y.S.2d 423, 425-26 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (holding that, absent some special relationship, no 
liability may attach to a broker beyond any that may arise out of obtaining the 
policy on the purchaser’s behalf). 
 59  Trammell v. Prairie States Ins. Co., 473 N.W.2d 460, 462 (S.D. 1991). 
 60  For example, in addition to the administrative penalties in a Lancaster 
County, PA case against a local broker, it is likely that these duties would 
capture the same activity. See, e.g., Tim Mekeel, Lancaster County insurance 
broker accused of overcharging customers, LANCASTER ONLINE (Mar. 19, 
2013, 4:10 PM), http://lancasteronline.com/article/local/827977_Lancaster-
County-insurance-broker-accused-of-overcharging-customers.html. 
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the insured exists. For instance, in Michigan, a duty to advise 
may arise where the broker misrepresents the scope of coverage.61 
This essentially equates to a duty to correct the 
misrepresentation. Similarly, if the broker gives inaccurate advice 
to a purchaser, the same duty to correct is triggered.62 Lastly, if 
the purchaser makes an ambiguous request for coverage, the 
broker must advise to the extent necessary to decide what 
coverage the purchaser is trying to obtain.63 
A special relationship may also arise depending on how a 
broker holds himself out. For instance, a Georgia court held that 
a broker who was receiving compensation for advice and holding 
himself out as a specialist in ensuring adequate coverage was 
bound by a duty to advise.64 Other courts have admitted parol 
evidence to show that a special relationship arose by implication. 
For instance, a New Jersey court held that where the insured 
asked for the “best available” coverage, that the insurance broker 
had a heightened duty to ensure that this was met.65 The court 
based its holding on a reliance rationale—because the insured 
gave the broker discretion to obtain the best available coverage, 
there was a heightened duty to exercise this discretion in a way 
that obtained that end.66 
Relatedly, but conceptually distinct, courts in some 
jurisdictions have suggested that brokers might be subjected to a 
heighted professional duty of care.67 In negligence causes of 
action, the care exercised by defendants is evaluated against a 
hypothetical reasonably prudent person standard.68 This inquiry, 
though, is tied to the circumstances of the conduct in question.69 
In occupations where you must be a specialist the law 
accordingly imposes the standard of care normally exercised by 
people in the profession.70 In light of the relatively low barriers to 
licensing, imposing professional liability upon brokers may be 
                                                          
 61  Pressey Enters., Inc. v. Barnett-France Ins. Agency, 724 N.W.2d 503, 
505 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006). 
 62  Pressey Enters., Inc. v. Barnett-France Ins. Agency, 724 N.W.2d 503, 
505 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006). 
 63  Id. 
 64  European Bakers, Ltd. v. Holman, 338 S.E.2d 702 (Ga. App. 1985). 
 65  Sobotur v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 491 A.2d 737 (N.J. App. 
1984) (superseded by statute in a respect immaterial to this proposition). 
 66  Id. 
 67  See Sakall, supra note 40, at 995 (citing cases). 
 68  Bell v. Maricopa Med. Ctr., 755 P.2d 1180, 1182 (Ariz. App. 1988). 
 69  See id. 
 70  Hardt v. Brink, 192 F. Supp. 879, 881 (W.D. Wash. 1961). 
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overreaching, although it has been proposed.71 Even with 
heightened educational requirements as may be required under 
the proposed change of law in this paper, imposing professional 
liability will not induce consumers to bring actions against 
negligent producers, as the damages at issue here are relatively 
small.72 Also, insurance producers are categorically different than 
other professionals, such as lawyers and doctors, whose 
allegiances must be pure in order to adequately serve their 
client’s interest. Such professionals are entrusted generally with 
property and issues of much higher consequence. Conversely, 
producers are market makers, albeit in a specialized field, so, 
while no duty to advise is inappropriate, a full professional 
standard of care is likewise inappropriate. 
All “duties” discussed above could, however, be treated 
simply as creatures of contract. An oral contract to obtain an 
insurance policy, even if the policy would last for more than one 
year, is not barred by the statute of frauds.73 An oral agreement to 
obtain a policy as instructed is likely per se enforceable.74 But 
even if it were not, in the event that the consumer purchaser 
changes its position in reasonable reliance on the producer’s 
promise to obtain the policy, promissory estoppel would likely 
bar any defense on statute of frauds grounds.75 
In any event, the duties imposed upon producers are 
minimal under the common law and they do not at all conform to 
the reasonable expectation that to some extent insurance agents 
will take care of people by providing them with policies that are 
suitable to their situations. Indeed, many even invited reliance by 
consumers to varying degrees.76 
                                                          
 71  See generally Sakall, supra note 40, at 995. 
 72  See, e.g., Leslie Scism, Insurance Fees, Revealed, (March 30, 2012 
5:08PM EDT), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230417710457730593020277033
6.html (noting that on a $1000 brokered automobile insurance policy, the 
commission would be roughly $150-200). 
 73  4-12 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §12.8[I][A] (citing cases). 
 74  See Saunders, 224 Cal. App. 2d at 909 (suggesting that the duty of a 
broker to obtain the policy it promises could be characterized as an oral 
contract). 
 75  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §139. 
 76  See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Problem 2: Compensation Arrangements Causing Conflicts of 
Interest 
This section will now outline the second problem this 
paper aims to ameliorate through the non-maleficence rule, 
namely, how compensation arrangements between producers and 
insurers creates conflicts of interests between producers and 
consumers. This is a recognized problem,77 the solution for which 
has been disjointed among the states. 
Compensation for insurance brokers can come in four 
basic forms: salaries, commissions, bonuses, and fees. Depending 
on whether a broker is self-employed or not, the compensation 
sources may differ. Typically, a large portion of an insurance 
broker’s income comes from commissions.78 Commissions are 
usually calculated as a proportion of the premium amounts paid 
by the insured.79  Compensation may also be based upon volume 
of sales, that is, the number of policies sold,80 or tied to the 
profitability of the contract for the insurer.81 Producers may also 
charge broker fees.82 Commissions are paid by the insurer, 
                                                          
 77  See INSURANCE JOURNAL, N.Y. Attorney General Targets Insurance 
Broker Compensation Arrangements (April 23, 2004), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2004/04/23/41434.htm 
(discussing in part the “placement service agreements” which encourage 
producers to steer consumers to purchase contracts from certain insurers in 
order to obtain the more favorable compensation). 
 78  See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Occupational 
Handbook, 2012-13 Edition, Insurance Sales Agents, 
http://www.bls.gov/ooh/sales/insurance-sales-agents.htm. (last visited May 5, 
2013). 
 79  See, e.g., ZURICH AMERICAN INS. CO., Agent/Broker Compensation 
Schedule – Auto Liability, 
http://www.zurichnaproducercompensation.com/AutoLiability.aspx (last visited 
May 5, 2013). 
 80  See Joanne Wojcik, Contingent Commissions back in the spotlight, 
BUSINESS INSURANCE (July 17, 2011), 
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/99999999/NEWS050101/399999919; 
see, e.g., UNITED HEALTHCARE, Overview of Producer Compensation, 
http://www.uhc.com/legal/overview_of_producer_compensation.htm (last 
visited May 5, 2013) (noting that bonuses and “override” payments may be 
made “in recognition of a high volume of sales”). 
 81  See, e.g., ZURICH AMERICAN INS. CO., Agent/Broker Compensation 
Schedule – Workers’ Compensation, 
http://www.zurichnaproducercompensation.com/WorkersCompensation.aspx 
(last visited May 5, 2013). 
 82  See STATE OF NEW YORK INS. DEP’T, Circular Letter No. 22 (Aug. 25, 
1998), available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/circltr/1998/c198_22.htm 
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essentially splitting the premium with the producer.83 In addition, 
broker fees are paid by the insured.84 
As a basic matter, it stands to reason that since 
commissions are paid on the total premium amounts, the 
producer will have an incentive to try and push premiums higher 
by covering more risks. The more risks covered, the higher the 
premiums.85 In the alternative (depending on the producer’s go-
to-market strategy and the contractual compensation 
arrangements with carriers), the producer might also aim to sell 
as many policies as possible.  Also, where one insurer pays a 
higher commission rate, a broker will have an incentive to steer 
consumers to such insurer over another, even if that policy will 
cost the consumer purchaser more.86 In the case of sales targets, 
the incentive may be in the opposite direction. If a broker is 
employed by a brokerage house that pays bonuses based upon 
hitting sales targets, this may create incentives to sell policies that 
do not adequately cover risk—whether by risk type, in coverage 
amount, or with higher deductibles—in the pursuit of higher sales 
figures. 
C.  Other Regulatory Methods and their Deficiencies 
Aside from the common law duties, or lack thereof, there 
are also other statutory and regulatory methods of regulating 
insurance producers, two of which are licensure and 
                                                          
(noting the existence of additional fees charged by brokers directly to the end 
consumer purchaser of the insurance contract). 
 83  See ZURICH AMERICAN INS. CO., Agent/Broker Compensation Schedule 
– Workers’ Compensation, Table, 
http://www.zurichnaproducercompensation.com/WorkersCompensation.aspx 
(last visited May 5, 2013) (showing percentage amounts paid for commissions 
on workers’ compensation insurance contracts). 
 84  See Stephen L. Young, When May Broker-Agents Charge Fees?, at 1, 
http://www.ibawest.com/pdf/Articles/WhenMayBrokerAgentsChargeFees.pdf 
(suggesting that fees may be charged by brokers, so long as disclosed). 
 85  See generally, Jessica Bosari, What Really Goes into Determining Your 
Insurance Rates, FORBES.COM (Jan. 8, 2013 11:53AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/moneywisewomen/2013/01/08/what-really-goes-
into-determining-your-insurance-rates/ (last visited May 8, 2013) (discussing 
risk factors and relationship of them to premiums). 
 86  Depending on the phase of the underwriting cycle, insurers may pay 
higher commissions. For instance, early in the cycle where they are trying to 
build out their pool in a specific risk type or geography, they may pay higher 
commissions to induce brokers to push their insurance products over a 
competitors’. See Conwell, supra note 36, at 2. 
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compensation disclosure. While these may eliminate some degree 
of the two problems at issue here, they do not suffice for the 
reasons outlined below. 
1.  Licensure 
Broker licensing regimes among the states are more or less 
uniform. The National Association of Insurance Commissions 
(NAIC) began an effort to make licensing uniform in 1999 with 
the Producer Licensing Model Act (PLMA). As of 2009, the 
federal Government Accountability Office reported 47 states had 
adopted this act.87 The NAIC followed the PLMA with issuing 
standards for licensure, which, by 2008, the NAIC boasted had 
been adopted in large part by many states.88 These standards, 
among other issues, address things like minimum age, citizenship, 
education level, acceptable versions of study and verifications on 
such study, test procedures, standards, retesting rules, 
background checking procedures, and minimum personal 
integrity standards.89 As with other professional licensing 
regimes, these circulate around minimum competency and 
character standards.90 
While competency standards exist to make sure that the 
broker we rely upon is worthy of our trust in the subject matter, 
character standards make sure that brokers are not predisposed 
to morally untrustworthy acts. The PLMA provides in section 12 
the bases upon which a license may be denied, not renewed, or 
revoked.91 The grounds for denial, non-renewal or revocation of a 
license ambulate back and forth between fraudulent or dishonest 
acts,92 such as outright fraud or forgery,93 to criminal or morally 
                                                          
 87  UNITED STATES GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Report to 
Congressional Requesters, Insurance Reciprocity and Uniformity: NAIC and 
State Regulators Have Made Progress in Producer Licensing . . . but 
Challenges Remain (April 2009), at 15, available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/288231.pdf. 
 88  NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, NAIC Licensing Assessment Aggregate 
Report of Findings (Feb. 19, 2008), at 4-5, 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_ex_pltf_plwg_PLC_assessment_a
ggregate_report.pdf. 
 89  Id. at 11-12. 
 90  See, e.g., MODEL RULES FOR PROF’L CONDUCT, Preamble [4] – [5] 
(providing for the general requirements of competency and conformance with 
the law in personal affairs for attorneys). 
 91  PRODUCER LICENSING MODEL ACT OF 2000, § 12. 
 92  See, e.g., id. §12 (A) (1) (providing that providing “incorrect, misleading, 
incomplete, or material untrue information in the license application” is 
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reprehensible acts, such as felony convictions or not complying 
with any child support obligation to which a licensee is subject.94  
Violation of any insurance law may also constitute a ground for 
denial.95 
This framework points to actions, which serve as proxies 
for competency and moral trustworthiness, which correspond 
with predispositions for adequate care and loyalty. In this sense, 
by a broadly sweeping sorting mechanism, licensure attempts to 
address the same issues that the duties of care and loyalty do. 
Licensing standards do a good amount of work to sort the grain 
from the chaff, but they do not require a producer to provide 
policies suitable to the consumer purchaser. Moreover, they do 
not prohibit the sale of a higher priced policy in order to get a 
higher commission unless such an act rises to the level of an 
unfair trade practice.96 
2.  Fee Disclosures 
In 1998, insurance regulators in New York became aware 
of additional fees being charged, in addition to commissions, by 
brokers. In a circular, the regulator noted that the charging of 
these fees absent disclosure gave rise to “a perception that brokers 
are conflicted in their loyalties.”97 Moreover, the circular noted 
that the charging of these fees may violate section 2110 of the 
New York Insurance Law, which prohibits dishonest and 
untrustworthy practices by brokers.98 
This is a wider issue that has been recognized by the 
community of insurance commissioners of many states. In 2006, 
the President of the NAIC noted that state commissioners had 
continued to examine the potential for conflicts of interests that 
arise from undisclosed fees and commissions.99 In 2004, Eliot 
                                                          
grounds for denial, non-renewal, or revocation of license). 
 93  Id. § 12 (A) (8), (12). 
 94  Id. § 12 (A) (2), (6), (13). 
 95  PRODUCER LICENSING MODEL ACT OF 2000, § 12(A)(2). 
 96  See id. § 12(A)(7). 
 97  STATE OF NEW YORK INS. DEP’T, Circular Letter No. 22 (Aug. 25, 
1998), available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/circltr/1998/c198_22.htm. 
 98  Id. 
 99  See Public Remarks of Allessandro Iuseppi, President of the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners, NAIC Financial Summit, March 21, 
2006, at transcription pages 8-9, available at 
http://www.naic.org/Releases/2006_docs/finical_summitt_Address_NAIC_issu
es-IUPPA.pdf. 
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Spitzer sued March & McLennan Cos., Aon, and Willis Group—
the three largest brokerage houses in the U.S.—alleging  that the 
brokers had been steering its clients toward certain insurance 
carriers in exchange for additional payments from such 
carriers.100 There were other similar suits against smaller 
producers.101 More recently, the Federation of Risk Management 
Associations called upon the European Parliament to pass laws 
requiring basic fee disclosures by producers as well.102 
Some fee disclosure rules require only disclosure of fees 
additional to commissions paid by insurers.103 New York’s 
Insurance Regulation 194 requires disclosure of not only fees but 
also commission amounts, if the consumer requests it after an 
initial required disclosure by the broker that he or she “will 
receive compensation . . . in whole or in part on the insurance 
contract the [producer] sells . . . .”104 This initial disclosure may be 
performed orally or in writing.105 The initial disclosure does not 
have to include any factors which affect the amount of 
compensation the broker will receive;106 it must only state that the 
consumer can obtain additional information on the “nature, 
amount and source” of the compensation upon request.107 The 
consumer may also obtain a list of “alternative quotes presented 
to the producer” by the carriers.108 
Disclosure has been deemed a sufficient solution to other 
                                                          
 100  Kathy M. Kristof, Insurance Broker to Settle Charges, LOS ANGELES 
TIMES (Jan. 6, 2006), http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jan/06/business/fi-ulr6; 
see INSURANCE JOURNAL, N.Y. Attorney General Targets Insurance Broker 
Compensation Arrangements (April 23, 2004), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2004/04/23/41434.htm. 
 101  See Kristof, supra note 100 (noting the suit and $2 million settlement of 
suit brought by Spitzer against Universal Life Resources of Del Mar, Cal. and 
the action also waged against Universal Life Resources by the California 
insurance commissioner). 
 102  Sarah Veysey, FERMA Urges fee disclosures for all insurance buyers, 
BUSINESS INSURANCE (March 19, 2013 10:13AM), 
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20130319/NEWS04/130319819. 
 103  See, e.g., Cal. Code of Reg., Tit. 10, Ch. 5, Subch. 1, Art. 6.8, § 
2189.3(d) (requiring disclosure of fees in accordance with an Appendix A); see 
also Cal. Code of Reg., Tit. 10, Ch. 5, Subch. 1, Art. 6.8, Appendix A 
(providing that fees are payments made by the policy purchaser to the broker 
are in addition to commissions that may be paid by carrier). 
 104  11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 30.3(a)(3). 
 105  11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 30.3(a). 
 106  11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 30.3(a)(3). 
 107  11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 30.3(b)(1). 
 108  11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 30.3(b)(2). 
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problems in financial products regulation, such as the U.S. 
securities laws. The securities laws, however, presuppose that, 
because the capital markets are presumptively efficient, that all 
public information is incorporated into the price of the security.109 
Therefore, the reasoning goes, it is immaterial whether the end 
purchaser reads or understands the disclosure, as dutiful equity 
analysts, being the soldiers of efficiency that they are, pore over 
the disclosure forms and the price shifts according to their 
buy/sell recommendations. 
Consumer insurance contracts are not traded on an 
exchange. Therefore, it is less likely that information is 
necessarily incorporated into the price that consumer purchasers 
are willing to pay for insurance contracts. Also, the Regulation 
194 disclosures are not going to sophisticated analysts, but to the 
consumers themselves. It is an open question whether, even if the 
purchasers do request the additional disclosure, that they read 
and understand them. The disclosure forms produced by 
Independent Insurance Agents and Brokers of New York, Inc. 
(IIABNY), a private trade group,110 allow for the compensation to 
be disclosed in a percentage or number.111 Most people 
understand the difference between a proportion and an absolute 
number, but would they be willing to do calculations? The tables 
IIABNY provides for the comparison of quotes are more 
promising. They lay things out plainly enough including, most 
importantly, the compensation that the producer will receive.112 
If whether entrusting ourselves to our brokers is 
reasonable depends on the cost of verifying the truth and honesty 
of their assertions,113 these disclosures may reduce monitoring 
costs. The efficacy of such monitoring depends directly on 
whether the information is requested and, if so, whether it is read 
and understood. Even if consumers do not make disclosure 
                                                          
 109  See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988). 
 110  See INDEP. INS. AGENTS AND BROKERS OF NEW YORK, About us, 
http://www.iiabny.org/AboutUs/Pages/default.aspx (“[IIABNY exists to fulfill 
the educational, political, and business interests of our . . . agencies and . . . 
employees”). 
 111  INDEP. INS. AGENTS AND BROKERS OF NEW YORK, Statement of 
Compensation, Ownership Interest, and Prohibition Against Rebating, 
available at 
http://ny.iiaa.org/Advocacy/Reg194/2_Comp_Ownership_Rebating.pdf. 
 112  See INDEP. INS. AGENTS AND BROKERS OF NEW YORK, Description of 
Alternative Quotes, available at 
http://ny.iiaa.org/Advocacy/Reg194/2_AltQuotesPresented_PC.pdf. 
 113  See FRANKEL, supra note 4, at 52. 
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requests, the fear of requests might deter unscrupulous practices 
as well. 
The New York Department of Financial Services stated to 
the author that they do not have any data on how often 
consumers actually request the additional disclosures because 
“agents are not required to report this information to [the 
department].”114 To the author’s knowledge, there are no public 
sources of such data either. Perhaps Regulation 194 has curbed 
unscrupulous practices, but this would depend on how often 
additional disclosures are requested, whether consumers read and 
understand the information provided, what consumers do with 
the information, or whether reputational risk provides a sufficient 
deterrent. The SEC recently published a study showing that most 
Americans surveyed lacked basic financial literacy,115 which may 
cast doubt on the efficacy of disclosures directly to consumers. 
While reputational risk may have some deterrent effect, it is not 
clear that it is sufficient.116 Moreover, the duties imposed or 
implied by law or equity have replaced in large part the norms 
that bind closely-knit communal societies with the transition to a 
modern market-based economy wherein economic incentives lead 
to moral hazard.117 Thus, reputational risk may be insufficient to 
deter unscrupulous steering by producers, even if it has some 
minor demonstrable deterring effect. 
IV.  THE SUITABILITY STANDARD 
A suitability standard applies to broker-dealers118 of 
                                                          
 114  E-mail from Patricia Douglas, Ass. Ins. Examiner, Consumer 
Assistance Unit of the New York Department of Financial Services, to the 
author (May 3, 2013, 2:00PM EDT) (on file with author) 
 115  SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY REGARDING FINANCIAL LITERACY 
AMONG INVESTORS (AUG. 2012), AT III, AVAILABLE AT 
HTTP://WWW.SEC.GOV/NEWS/STUDIES/2012/917-FINANCIAL-LITERACY-STUDY-
PART1.PDF. 
 116  At least as far as the large brokerage houses are concerned, the specter 
of a reputational stain may be limited in efficacy where cash flow is king. See 
Kenneth J. St. Onge, Aon Will Begin Accepting Contingent Commissions 
Again, Insurance Journal (Aug. 2, 2010), available at 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/features/2010/08/02/159998.htm 
(noting that, notwithstanding five year prohibition on the same under the 
Spitzer settlement, Aon would begin to accept contingent commissions again). 
 117 See Brescia, supra note 18, at 313. 
 118  A broker is a person in the business of effecting transactions in 
securities on the account of others. 15 U.S.C.A § 78c(a)(4)(A). A dealer is a 
person in the business of buying and selling securities on its own account. 15 
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financial securities under FINRA rules, the securities laws, and 
now, pursuant to Dodd-Frank, residential mortgage brokers as 
well. This section will introduce the suitability standard as 
applied to both, the additional rules added by Dodd-Frank for 
mortgage brokers to supplement and will tailor the suitability 
standard to that context. 
A.  Introduction to the Standard as Applied to Broker-Dealers 
The suitability standard essentially requires that a broker-
dealer know his customer and, given this knowledge, make 
recommendations upon some reasonable basis that the product is 
suitable specifically to the customer.119 This standard imposes a 
lighter duty than full fiduciary duties, which is generally viewed 
as the highest standard under the law.120 It essentially operates as 
a pared down duty of care. Implicit in the notion of finding a 
suitable product is a certain amount of diligence. One must study 
the terms of the instrument, its volatility, its historical returns 
and future outlook in order to determine if it is a good 
investment. In addition, the suitability standard requires the 
broker-dealer to consider the particular customer’s appetite for 
risk and investment goals and compare prospective securities 
available for purchase against them. 
Where a broker-dealer of securities recommends a security 
to an investor, the broker-dealer must conclude, first, that the 
investment product in question would be suitable for that 
investor.121 That is, if a product recommended by a broker-dealer 
were to turn out a sham product, then the broker-dealer might be 
held to have not discharged its obligations under this prong if he 
could have discovered the sham with reasonable diligence. 
Second, the broker-dealer must look to the particular customer in 
question and determine whether the product is suitable to the 
consumer specifically based on the individual’s characteristics, 
                                                          
U.S.C.A § 78c(a)(5)(A). They are often referred to together, as rules are often 
applicable to both. 
 119  FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., FINRA Manual, Rule 2111(a), 
available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=1339
0&element_id=9859&highlight=2111 (last visited May 6, 2013). 
 120  SEC. INDUS. AND FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, FIDUCIARY STANDARD RESOURCE 
CENTER, OVERVIEW, AVAILABLE AT HTTP://WWW.SIFMA.ORG/ISSUES/PRIVATE-
CLIENT/FIDUCIARY-STANDARD/OVERVIEW/. 
 121  Frank A. Hirsch, Jr., The Evolution of the Suitability Standard in the 
Mortgage Industry, 12 N.C.  BANKING INST. 21, 26 (2008). 
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such net worth, finances, investment goals, risk aversion, and tax 
status.122 
While Rapp suggested that the FINRA suitability 
standard does not prescribe a care standard,123 this is not entirely 
correct. He was correct to state that the standard operates more 
as an ex post mechanism for evaluating the reasonableness of a 
particular recommendation made by a broker in light of the 
investment goals of the purchaser.124 But, just because the 
FINRA rule does not state the level of attention to the 
purchaser’s interests required does not mean that there is no 
standard of care. Indeed, the standard is stated in the rule itself—
reasonableness—a standard that permeates the Anglo-American 
common law and which has a definite and clear meaning, even if 
it is always tied to the facts and circumstances to which it is 
applied. These rules incorporate the common law concept of 
reasonableness.125 Reasonableness in this context means that if a 
reasonably prudent stockbroker would not have recommended 
the stock in light of its risk profile and the investment goals of the 
purchaser, then such recommendation is not reasonable. 
The SEC, through Rule 17(a)(3)(17), also requires broker-
dealers who deal in securities transactions with individuals to 
obtain relevant information in order to make a customer-specific 
suitability determination. Aside from personal biographical and 
contact information, this rule requires that broker-dealers obtain 
account investment objectives (e.g., for retirement), the annual 
income of the individual, his or her net worth, and whether he or 
she is employed in a brokerage firm.126 The text of the rule states 
that broker-dealers “shall make and keep . . .  the following books 
and records” of which the above records are included.127 But it 
also excuses any non-compliance of a broker-dealer on account of 
the “neglect, refusal, or inability” to provide relevant information 
by a customer.128 So long as a broker-dealer makes a good faith 
                                                          
 122  Id. 
 123  Robert N. Rapp, Rethinking Risky Investments for that Little Old 
Lady: A Realistic Role for Modern Portfolio Theory in Assessing Suitability 
Obligations of Stockbrokers, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 189, 192 (1998). 
 124  See id. 
 125  Cf.  Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 358 (2005) (noting in 
the context of statutory interpretation that “long-established and familiar 
principles” of the common law are presumed to be retained unless statutory 
purpose indicates clear contrary purpose). 
 126  17 C.F.R. § 240.17a3(a)(17). 
 127  17 C.F.R. § 240.17a3(a) (2013). 
 128  17 C.F.R. §240.17a3(a)(17)(i)(C) (2008). 
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effort to obtain the required information, they will not run afoul 
of the rule.129 But broker-dealers function as market makers for 
whom the regulators tailored a rule, which corresponds to what 
the regulators deem to be appropriate given their function. 
Administratively, the efficacy of any suitability standard 
requires information gathering and record keeping effort 
requirements. The good faith excuse, while to an extent 
undermining the efficacy of the broker-dealer suitability 
standard, reflects what might be called a forearm’s length nature 
of the transaction. While not a full arm’s length away such that 
no duties at all are required, full fiduciary duties are not imposed 
either. The issue lies in the “reasonable basis” requirement of the 
suitability standard. In the absence of required record keeping, 
there is little evidence to refute any reasonable basis 
manufactured ex post. 
SRO’s, in this case FINRA, must enforce compliance with 
these rules.130 Non-compliance by an SRO may result in the 
SRO’s suspension of authority to regulate its members, the 
revocation of its registration with the SEC, and censure or other 
limitations on its activities.131 Similarly, the SEC may also do the 
same to any member of the SRO in order to protect the interests 
of investors.132 It follows that the teeth of these enforcement 
mechanisms when it comes to the broker-dealers transacting with 
purchasers of securities is in the prevention of members from 
working in the industry. 
However, a private plaintiff may also bring an action 
under Rule 10(b)(5), which prohibits misrepresentations and 
fraud committed with scienter in connection with the purchase or 
sale of a security.133 The Supreme Court has stated that this 
private right is available to purchasers and sellers of the 
securities.134 In order to bring an action under 10(b) for breach of 
the suitability requirement, a plaintiff must prove: 
(1) that the securities purchased were unsuited to the 
                                                          
 129  See Broker-Dealers: Why They Ask for Personal Information, 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers/bd-
persinfo.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2013). 
 130  See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2013).; see also 
17 C.F.R. § 240.19g2-1(a) (2013). 
 131  Id., § 19(h)(1) (2013). 
 132  Id., 19(h)(2) (2013).; see also id. 3(b) (2013). (including in the definition 
of “member” any broker-dealer “who agrees to be regulated by [an SRO]”). 
 133  See 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (2013). 
 134  Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740 (1975). 
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buyer’s needs; (2) that the defendant knew or reasonably believed 
the securities were unsuited to the buyer’s needs; (3) that the 
defendant recommended or purchased the unsuitable securities 
for the buyer anyway; (4) that, with scienter, the defendant made 
material misrepresentations (or, owing a duty to the buyer, failed 
to disclose material information) relating to the suitability of the 
securities; and (5) that the buyer justifiably relied to its detriment 
on the defendant’s fraudulent conduct.135 
B.  Suitability Standard as Applied Mortgage Brokers 
The Dodd-Frank Act takes the suitability rule and 
modifies it to the context of regulating mortgage brokers and 
tailors it with additional rules specific to this context. In addition 
to its myriad of other reforms, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 
addresses the activities and qualifications of mortgage brokers, 
which it terms “mortgage originators.”136 First it requires that all 
mortgage brokers be duly qualified and registered or licensed as 
required under state or federal law and that such brokers have a 
unique identifying number which it places on all documents 
associated with any transaction they broker.137 It also imposes 
upon depository institutions a duty to ensure that these 
requirements are met.138 
But, the Act goes further. It directly imposes upon the 
brokers a modified suitability requirement. A broker may not 
steer a consumer to undertake any residential mortgage that “the 
consumer lacks a reasonable ability to repay” or that has 
“predatory characteristics or effects.”139 These rules apply to 
creditors, the ultimate counterparty to the mortgages, as well.140 
Regulation Z, promulgated by the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau pursuant to its obligation to do so under the 
Dodd-Frank Act (but not yet adopted on the date this article 
went to print), prescribes “ability to repay” information that 
                                                          
 135  Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir.1993). 
 136  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1602 (2013) (amending the Truth in Lending Act to define a mortgage 
originator as anyone “takes,” “assists a consumer in obtaining or applying to 
obtain,” or “offers or negotiates terms of” a residential mortgage loan). 
 137  Id. § 1639a-b (adding Section 129B(b)(1)(A)-(B) to the Truth in 
Lending Act). 
 138  Id. (adding Section 129B(b)(2) to the Truth in Lending Act. 
 139  Id. (adding Section 129B(b)(3)(A) to the Truth in Lending Act). 
 140  See id. § 1639c. 
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mortgage brokers must collect.141 
1.  Additional Rules for Mortgage Brokers 
Moreover, a broker may not steer a consumer to a 
mortgage that is not a “qualified mortgage” if the consumer 
qualifies for a qualified mortgage. A qualified mortgage is a 
mortgage that lacks certain characteristics, for instance, negative 
amortization, interest-only payment, balloon payments, or terms 
that exceed 30 years along with stricter underwriting 
requirements.142 This essentially equates to a prohibition on 
selling a consumer on a mortgage, which has characteristics that 
are known to be problematic for consumer mortgage borrowers if 
a mortgage that lacks these characteristics is available. These 
provisions are likely due to the lack of regulation of the terms of 
mortgages leading up to the financial crisis. This is a point of 
contrast with the consumer insurance contract terms, which are 
subject to regulatory approval by state commissioners of 
insurance.143 However, the qualified mortgage rule is still 
instructive as it serves as the model for the anti-maleficence rule 
proposed here. 
Dodd-Frank goes even further. It places a blanket ban 
against financial incentives paid to mortgage brokers by any 
person at all on account of the terms of the mortgage contract it 
brokers.144 It also totally disallows the receipt of compensation 
from both the creditor mortgagee and the consumer mortgagor.145 
Both of these provisions obviously raise a conflict of interests 
concern between the mortgage broker and consumer 
mortgagor.146 
Having laid out now the suitability requirement as applied 
to broker-dealers and mortgage brokers, the study now turns to 
the proposed framework for producer regulation. 
                                                          
 141  See generally 12 C.F.R 1026.43(c) (1)-(2) (2013). See Note 
 142  See 12 C.F.R. 1026.43(e) (2013). See Note 
 143  See, e.g., supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 144  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1403 (2013) (adding section 129B(c)(1) to the Truth in Lending Act). 
 145  Id. 
 146  See BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION, Loan 
Originator Compensation Requirements under the Truth in Lending Act, Final 
Rule; official interpretations, at 148-49, 301 (Jan. 10, 2013), available at 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201301_cfpb_final-rule_ability-to-repay.pdf. 
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V. SUITABILITY AS ALTERNATIVE TO THE DEFECTS OF 
THE COMMON LAW AND LICENSURE REGIMES 
Like the Dodd-Frank Act did with mortgage broker 
regulation, this paper proposes a suitability rule modified to the 
producer regulation context and supplemented by an additional 
rule to address the unique regulatory challenges of this context. 
As shown above, the common law in general treats producers as 
mere salespersons. But, like mortgage brokers and broker-dealers 
of securities, producers perform a much larger role in the 
consumer insurance markets than the duties the common law 
imposes upon them would suggest. As of 2004, at least 32% of the 
personal lines market was intermediated by some type of 
producer.147 As of 2009, when you combine personal lines with 
property and casualty insurance, almost 50% of the market is 
brokered by independent agents or brokers.148 If the producer has 
no duty to advise them, then how do they know if they are getting 
the appropriate coverage for their risks? 
A suitability standard, tailored to the facts of the 
insurance industry, should be applied to producers in order to 
ameliorate any under- or over-coverage that may result from 
either a lack of care or steering to unsuitable contracts by 
producers. As I will show below, together with the non-
maleficence standard, a suitability standard would curb 
producers’ incentives to offer products unsuitable to their 
customers. Moreover, legislatures and regulators should consider 
imposing the compliance onus on the insurers to make sure their 
producers adhere to these requirements. This will help to 
discourage the wastefulness of fighting for access to deeper 
pockets by imputation of producer acts to the insurer that has 
plagued the common law on this subject.149 Beyond this, it would 
                                                          
 147  See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 26 at 363 (noting that 32% of total 
personal lines insurance market intermediated by independent agents or 
brokers and that some is also brokered by exclusive agents). As of 2009, it 
appears that number was roughly the same. Madelyn Flannagan & Peter van 
Aartrijk, 2009 Property-Casualty Insurance Market: Opportunities & 
Competitive Challenges for Independent Agents and Brokers, 5 INDEPENDENT 
INSURANCE AGENTS AND BROKERS OF AMERICA, at  
http://www.independentagent.com/Resources/Research/SiteAssets/MarketShar
eReport/IIABA-Marketshare-Report-2010.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2013) (see 
table entitled “2009 Personal lines”). 
 148  See Flannagan & van Aartrijk, supra note 147, at 5 (48.8%). 
 149  For discussions of imputation of producer acts to insurers, see supra 
notes 51-52. 
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give attorneys general a clear, centralized strategy for rooting out 
producer carelessness and conflicted actions. 
The provisions of Dodd-Frank related to mortgage 
brokers are instructive, because the relationship between a 
mortgage broker and a consumer borrower is similar to the 
relationship between a producer and consumer purchaser. Both 
are the face that the end consumer sees and interacts with. Before 
the financial crisis, mortgage brokers were primarily paid on two 
bases, through direct fees paid by the borrower150 and through 
contingent payments from the ultimate creditor based on the 
interest rate increases from a baseline, which increase with the 
yield spread premium (and so the profitability of the loan to the 
creditor).151 These compensation sources, in essence, directly 
correspond to the broker fees and the contingent payment sources 
of income discussed above in connection with producer 
compensation.152 
Moreover, there are huge information asymmetries 
between producers and consumer purchasers of insurance, just 
like between mortgage brokers and consumer mortgagors.153 
Depending on the type of insurance, consumers may only 
purchase the coverage in question a few times in their lives. As 
noted above, a New Jersey court once held that a producer who 
was asked to obtain the “best available” coverage was under a 
duty to do just that based upon a reliance rationale and the 
reposing of discretion in the producer.154 While not requiring a 
producer to obtain the “best available” policies, the suitability 
standard proposed here is based on the same rationale, as to a 
certain extent consumers always repose discretion in their 
producers. 
Additionally, consumer insurance policies are not 
available for review pre-purchase.155 Even if they were, however, 
there is scant likelihood that the average consumer would know 
                                                          
 150  Herbert J. Cohen, How are Mortgage Brokers Paid?, at  
http://www.realtor.com/home-finance/homebuyer-information/how-are-
mortgage-brokers-paid.aspx (last visited Sept. 27, 2013). 
 151  See Id. 
 152  See supra, notes 81-82 and accompanying text. 
 153  James Lacko & Janis Pappalardo, Improving Consumer Mortgage 
Disclosures: An Empirical Assessment of Current and Prototype Disclosure 
Forms, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ES-12 (June 2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/06/P025505MortgageDisclosureReport.pdf. 
 154  See Sobotur, 491 A.2d at 737. 
 155  Schwarcz, supra note 17, at 1318-25. 
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what they say.156 While the average producer might also have 
doubts as to what they say, they are in a better position to find 
out and, therefore, the onus should be upon the producer.157 This 
is exactly the scenario wherein it is reasonable for a person to rely 
on the person selling the consumer a policy. An untrained person, 
who has spent his time and efforts developing alternative skills to 
offer the world, cannot be expected to understand everything he 
needs to know in order to get the coverage he needs.158 
A.  Producer Suitability Recommendations 
The first step of a producer suitability standard would be 
relatively easy. Assuming that the producer delivers accurate 
data to the insurer, the quotes and contracts provided to the 
producer should satisfy the first step of a suitability standard, 
namely, that the policies offered be suitable to some consumers. 
But producers should also have a duty to know their customer, at 
least as to elements relevant to obtaining the appropriate 
coverage consistent with the consumer purchaser’s appetite for 
self-insuring, co-insurance, and deductible levels. For instance, 
state regulators could require that producers gather information 
such as, in the case of property insurance, an official appraisal on 
the value of the property they wish to insure and the extent to 
which the policy purchaser wants that value covered, which 
would include a discussion of the relationship between the scope 
of coverage and/or higher premiums. The same could go for a 
discussion of co-insurance and deductible levels. These types of 
discussions would be akin to a discussion of investment 
objectives and appetite for risk as a securities broker might have 
with his client. They could impose a duty to ensure compliance 
upon insurers, to lessen the regulatory burden and place on the 
entities that can most easily bear it. 
In general, producers now only ask questions related to 
the risks covered. For instance, for home insurance, they may ask 
the customer if there is a swimming pool, whether the house’s 
exterior is flammable (e.g., wood) or inflammable (e.g., stone), and 
the address of the home and its appraised value. Some of the 
                                                          
 156  Id. at 1325. 
 157 Cf. Symposium, The Future of Law and Economics: The Negligence-
Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 941, 942-43 
(1992) (discussing the least cost avoider rationale in tort and contract theory). 
 158 See FRANKEL, supra note 4, at 49 (noting the importance of relying on 
others for efficiency reasons). 
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better producers may ask for information related to the 
motivation for getting insurance. 
Under the proposed suitability standard, the producer 
should also be required to discuss the consumer purchaser’s 
appetite for bearing risk of losses through self-insurance, or 
increasing deductibles or co-insurance levels. Based on this 
information, then, the producer should go and obtain policy 
quotes that match the consumer’s level of risk aversion. They 
should also advise the consumer specifically what types of 
exposure they would be subject to under each policy. 
The producer should also be required to obtain the 
appraised value and only insure up to that value. Insurers are 
bound only to pay for the replacement value of property, subject 
to the policy limits, by the principle of indemnity.159 Therefore, 
even if the market value of a house in a neighborhood where 
housing prices are rising suggest a higher resell value, the 
appraised value would be the better marker of value that the 
producer should use so as not to extract premiums higher than 
what the insurer would ever have to pay out in an attempt to 
increase premiums. 
Courts have gone so far as to say that to impose any duty 
to advise upon brokers would be too onerous for them, as they 
generally lack the necessary education and knowledge to advise 
purchasers properly.160 Not imposing these duties makes sense in 
light of the relatively low educational requirements for becoming 
a licensed broker in most states.161 I believe this view is 
unacceptable. The fact that the only actor who transacts directly 
with the producer justifies a basic advising duty. Like a broker-
dealer or a mortgage broker, producers do much more than take 
orders and fill them. They hold themselves out as people the 
                                                          
 159  See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A 
GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES AND 
COMMERCIAL PRACTICES, PRACTITIONER’S EDITION §3.1(a), 135 (1988). 
 160  Rushing v. Frazier 477 So.2d 1317, 1319-20 (La. Ct. App. 1985). 
 161  For instance, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(NAIC) reported in 2008 that at least 35 states had adopted the recommended 
standard that no high school diploma is required. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. 
COMMISSIONERS, NAIC Producer Licensing Aggregate Report of Findings, 
Feb. 19, 2008, 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_ex_pltf_plwg_PLC_assessment_a
ggregate_report.pdf. The motivation for recommending such a low education 
level is not elucidated in the report. This paper suggests that educational 
requirements should be raised, at least to the extent necessary to give effect to 
the suitability standard and non-maleficence rule proposed here. 
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consumer public needs and as people who will hold themselves to 
a basic level of care. 
The suitability requirement, however, does not adequately 
address the potential for conflicts of interest that arise out of the 
compensation arrangements between insurers and producers.162 
Indeed, for this reason, Dodd-Frank required the SEC to produce 
a study to evaluate whether a higher standard should be applied 
to broker-dealers.163 In the study, the SEC recommended that a 
higher fiduciary standard should be imposed upon broker-
dealers.164 This was met with extreme approbation from the 
industry.165 In the same way that broker-dealers “are not just 
order takers,”166 producers are not just order takers, as consumers 
inevitably rely on them to some extent and have no way to 
evaluate their veracity. Nor do consumer purchasers of insurance 
get the opportunity to review the policy beforehand.167 
Where fee disclosure requirements attempt to do this, they 
either fail to provide the necessary information regarding the 
compensation from insurers to producers. Even if they provide 
sufficient information, the disclosures are made to consumers 
who may lack the appropriate sophistication to evaluate them. It 
would be better to just impose a rule that prevents the harm that 
concerns us, which this paper’s non-maleficence rule aims to do. 
                                                          
 162  See Tim Sobelewski, Fiduciary vs. Suitability – Which Standard is 
Best?, FINANCIAL PLANNING ASS’N at  
http://www.fpanet.org/ToolsResources/ArticlesBooksChecklists/Articles/Finan
cialPlanning/FiduciaryvsSuitabilityWhichstandardisbest/ (last visited Sept. 27, 
2013) (“[The suitability standard] does not demand that your broker do what is 
best for you—only that it is “suitable.”) (emphasis in original). 
 163  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78o, 80b-11 (2013). 
 164  See SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM’N, Study on Investment 
Advisers and Broker-Dealers, January 2011, at ii, available at  
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf. 
 165  See Elizabeth MacBride, Fiduciary Standard Soon May Regulate 
Broker-Dealer Deals, CNBC.COM, (April 29, 2013, 12:00AM EDT), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/100662116 (quoting former SEC chairman Arthur 
Levitt who commented that the imposition of the new standard “is extremely 
important, otherwise the industry wouldn’t be fighting it”). 
 166  Id. (quoting Arthur Levitt). 
 167  See Schwarcz, supra note 17 at 1318-25 (discussing the lack of 
transparency and unavailability of consumer insurance contracts for review 
pre-purchase). 
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B.  Producer Non-Maleficence Rule 
Similar to mortgage broker regulations, where Congress 
found that a suitability standard alone was not sufficient, so too 
does this paper propose a non-maleficence rule to address a 
challenge unique to insurance producer regulation. To further 
curb any incentive on account of the compensation arrangements 
between insurers and producers, additional legislative-teeth are 
needed. Instead of an all-out ban on incentive arrangements like 
in Dodd-Frank, which may be needed at times for legitimate 
reasons such as filling out the pool of risks in a given market,168 
the non-maleficence rule would state: 
[W]here there are two policies which are equally 
suitable to the particular consumer but with different 
compensation outcomes for the producer, the producer 
may not choose to sell the policy which leads to a better 
compensation outcome for him, unless that policy is 
equal or less in price than the policy which would lead 
to the worse compensation outcome for him. 
In this way, the producer would practice non-maleficence, 
in that he would not harm the consumer by choosing the policy 
that leads to a better outcome for him. 
Maleficence would be measured in the price paid. The 
benefit of this rule would be in its ease of administration. Bright 
line rules are administratively convenient and, therefore, 
efficient.169 While bright line rules can create a “blueprint for 
fraud”170 or other surreptitious non-compliance, this non-
maleficence rule does not exist in a vacuum. Indeed the first 
prong of this proposed reform is a standard-based care 
requirement. Only after the collection of all possible insurance 
contracts is delimited to those suitable substantively to the 
particular customer before the producer, then the inquiry 
abandons any further substantive inquiry for a pure comparison 
in terms of premium prices. The producer may not simply sell a 
lower priced contract if he reasonably cannot argue that it 
substantively meets the needs of the consumer. 
                                                          
 168  See infra note 172-83 and accompanying text. 
 169  See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista 532 U.S. 318, 3547 (2001) (Justice 
Souter commenting that bright line rules lead to administrative convenience). 
 170  Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and the Securities Laws: Opting 
Out of Securities Regulation by Private Agreement 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV.  
519, 562 (1999). 
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This simple approach is appropriate. Imposing upon 
producers any higher duty would, firstly, be unnecessary in light 
of the relatively small risks that are covered through consumer 
insurance contracts.171 Second, a higher duty may impose too high 
a cost on the producer in terms of worry and administrative effort 
than is justified by the compensation received.172 Lastly, a 
blanket proscription of financial incentives may actually impede 
the underwriting cycle, a key peculiarity of the insurance 
business, and may also impede competitiveness of the insurance 
markets. 
This last point bears additional consideration. Depending 
on where an insurer is in its underwriting cycle, which is the 
period of time during which an insurer’s profits go from a high 
point to a low point and then back again,173 an insurer may pay 
higher commissions in the first high point, when they are trying 
to attract more business, and lower rates during the time when 
they are trying to reestablish profitability.174 The underwriting 
cycle is a creature peculiar to the insurance industry.175 It is a 
product of the supply of insurance contracts in a given market, 
which arises as a result of insurers flooding a market with 
contracts in an effort to capitalize on a profit opportunity.176 
Profit opportunities are often driven by a rise in interest 
rates, which increases returns on investments insurers make in 
the capital markets.177 The glut of supply drives premium rates 
down,178 which increases actuarial insolvency risk. When a rash 
of losses occur then, the premiums charged then do not cover the 
losses and then insurers are either forced out of business, tap into 
reserves (which decreases return on equity) or have to be propped 
up by affiliates.179 Following this, the insurers who survive the 
downward sloping profit period are able to charge higher 
premiums and restore profitability.180 
As an initial matter, we might ask why we tolerate the 
                                                          
 171  See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 172  See Scism, supra note 72. 
 173  David J. Nye, et al., The Causes of the Medical Malpractice Cycle: An 
Analysis of Claims Data and Insurance Company Finances, 76 GEO. L.J. 1495, 
1525 (1988). 
 174  Conwell, supra note 36 at 2. 
 175  Nye, et al., supra note 172, at 1525. 
 176  Id. 
 177  Id. at 1526. 
 178  Id. 
 179  See generally, id. 
 180  Id. 
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underwriting cycle. Basically, it is a product of the business 
model. Where premiums equal expected losses from an insured 
pool,181 which they aim to do,182 insurance companies make no 
profit off of premiums. Therefore, profit must come from 
somewhere, which is through investment in the capital 
markets.183 To induce market participants to enter the market, 
there must be some profit incentive and, since this incentive in 
this context arises from returns on investments, we tolerate this 
because the insurance markets are essential to the operation of 
society.184 
Allowing competitive commission arrangements, 
combined with adequate solvency oversight by state insurance 
regulators, can encourage efficiency in the consumer insurance 
markets and ensure that large conglomerates are not extracting 
rents from the market.185 The tension between the commission 
arrangements and the non-maleficence rule will allow for 
competition while also protecting the consumer from conflicted 
steering by producers. Because the terms of insurance contracts 
are reviewed and approved by regulators,186 the predatory terms 
concern present in the residential mortgage markets is 
inapplicable to the consumer insurance market. Therefore, the 
non-maleficence rule only requires that, among suitable contracts, 
the producer may not choose one that results in a better 
compensation outcome for him if that contract will cost the 
customer more. 
Enforcement of this producer suitability and non-
maleficence rule should allow for a private right of action along 
                                                          
 181  See John A. Fibiger & Stephen G. Kellison, 23 TRANSACTIONS OF 
SOC’Y OF ACTUARIES 1, 1-3 (1971). 
 182  See id. 
 183  See Insurance Asset Management: Internal, External, or Both?, 
NATIONAL ASS’N OF INS. COMM’N, ET AL. at  
http://www.naic.org/capital_markets_archive/110826.htm (last visited Sept. 
27, 2013) (“Insurance companies, by their very nature, accumulate substantial 
amounts of cash that are used to purchase invested assets.”). 
 184  See Eberhaud Faust, The Fundamental Role of Insurance: Enabling 
Economic Growth and Social Development, MUNICH RE, at 4, 
http://www.genevaassociation.org/Portals/0/COP15_Munich_Re_presentation.
pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2013). 
 185  I define rent-seeking here as the act by one party to a contract 
increasing its wealth without any correlative value creation for its 
counterparty. That is, it is the extracting of wealth from an already established 
and static reservoir of value. See Ward Farnsworth, THE LEGAL ANALYST 66 
(2007). 
 186  See, e.g., supra note 21. 
Franke Article- Final- 11-20-13.docx (Do Not Delete)  11/26/2013  2:55 PM 
2013 Suitability and Non-maleficence 105 
the lines allowed under the broker-dealer suitability standard. 
However, due to the relatively low damages,187 there may be little 
incentive for private actors to bring suits. Therefore, imposing a 
duty upon insurers to make sure that any producer who brokers 
its insurance contracts, much like what is proposed under Dodd-
Frank with respect to the ultimate mortgage creditor whose 
residential loans are brokered by mortgage brokers. Insurance 
commissions could periodically review compliance and 
recommend to attorneys general where investigations are 
appropriate in addition to unfair trade practices actions. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In his characteristically adenoidal tone, Woody Allen 
might be tempted to amend his statement: “There are worse 
things than death, have you ever spent an evening reading about 
insurance producer regulation?” The regulation of insurance 
producers, while perhaps not demanding of popular attention,188 
is a perennial issue for insurance professionals—forever on the 
minds of scholars, practitioners, regulators and industry 
participants. While strides have been made in recent years to 
lessen the conflicts of interest created by the compensation 
arrangements through disclosure regimes, the efficacy of these is 
questionable. Similarly, the common law and licensure regimes 
are wholly inadequate in protecting the consumer purchasers of 
insurance reasonable reliance upon producers. 
While more study should be completed on what factors 
producers should consider when determining whether a policy is 
suitable, the consumer purchaser’s appetite for bearing risk, the 
replacement value of the property and the motivation for buying 
insurance should be considered. After searching for suitable 
policies, the producer should be bound by a non-maleficence rule, 
where he must give the consumer the best priced option, no 
matter the compensation outcome for the producer. In the event 
that there are two suitable options with equal price but differing 
compensation outcomes, the producer may choose the one with 
the better compensation outcome in order to ensure that insurers 
                                                          
 187  See Scism, supra note 72. 
 188  But see Leslie Alderman, Getting a Guide for the Jungle of Individual 
Health Policies, NEW YORK TIMES, at B5 (Sept. 11, 2010) available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/11/health/11patient.html?_r=0 (discussing in 
part the advisability of calling state insurance regulators to determine if any 
complaints have been filed against a broker before using them). 
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can ride their underwriting cycle through offering higher 
commissions where required to build market share, which will 
have the effect of increasing competitiveness in the market for 
consumer insurance. 
 
